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THE TRIAL OF ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL
ISSUES. OF FACT: I'
GEORGE H. DESSIONt
WE have been considering the broad problems of economic and
technological proof. We are now concerned with the narrower question
of admissibility of the types of evidence which typically are available
and relevant in antitrust proceedings. The nature of these types will
become apparent in the course of the discussion. Grouped in relation
to evidential doctrines familiar in the general run of cases, they will be
discussed under the following heads: (a) Use of Judicial Notice; (b)
Business Entries, Trade Publications, Standard Works and Official
Records and Reports; (c) Specially Prepared Material; and (d) Expert
Opinion.
The economic facts to be proved by such evidence usually include
the industry's production capacity, price studies, analyses of compara-
tive price behavior, sales, and financial statements of companies in the
industry. The technological facts to be proved include the history of
the technology; developments thereiri by particular defendant com-
panies and others; and conflicts and their adjustment, such as notices of
patent infringement, contested interferences, threats of patent litiga-
tion, litigation settlements, taking and granting of licenses, and pur-
chase of patents.
The sui generis character of economic proof in antitrust conspiracy
proceedings and a consequent tendency to relax many ordinary evi-
dential requirements have been explicitly recognized by the courts."
Some of the major considerations which work in this direction may be
worth reviewing briefly at this point before discussing the particular
types of evidence involved.
Effect of Having No Jury: Federal Rule 43 (a) provides, inter alia,
that all evidence which would heretofore have been admissible ". , .
in the Courts of the United States on the hearing of suits in equity,
.... " shall be admissible in any event. This, as pointed out in Moore's
Federal Practice, is a flexible provision; as with the rule as a whole,
"The cast .. .is toward admissibility, not exclusion." 1o The case
* Part I of this Article appeared in 58 YALE L. J. 1019 (1949).
t Lines Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
69. Some of these are collected in the reference cited in note 51, supra.
70. 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE § 43.02 (1938), at p. 3064-5: "One who goes to the
former federal equity cases expecting to find a body of evidence law which will inform him
whether particular evidence is admissible is likely to encounter some difficulty. Relatively
few equity cases discussed points of evidence, since those cases were generally tried with-
out a jury. True, equity opinions may be found which repeat common law rules of evl-
dence concerning the qualifications and questioning of expert witnesses, res geslae, the
admissibility of evidence of prior similar acts, or self-serving declarations. But these
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for relaxation of exclusionary rules is strongest in the absence of a jury.
As Moore points out:
"It is well known that the extensive and highly refined rules of evi-
dence have developed largely as methods of controlling juries. It
has been thought that a number of exclusionary rules are essential
to prevent an untrained group of men from reaching erroneous con-
clusions regarding the facts developed at a trial. The validity of
exclusionary rules of evidence as aids in determining what is a particu-
lar fact situation has been denied and rejected in practice before ad-
ministrative boards. In great measure the same result has been
occurring in suits in the federal courts, formerly denominated equi-
table." 71
Exceptional Complexity of Factual Issue: When the issues presented
to a court are such that proof must of necessity be voluminous, that
proof other than hearsay would normally be unavailable, or that
expert technical assistance would be unusually helpful, greater latitude
should be permitted, and the courts act accordingly. These general
trends should be noted: (1) greater latitude in the reception of hearsay;
(2) enlargement of the concept of original entries, and (3) enhanced
acceptance of expert opinion.
In a series of leading decisions, the federal courts, confronted with
exceptional problems of proof, have relaxed the usual limitations on
the admission of hearsay in the form of standard works, treatises, and
government publications; and they have similarly relaxed the usual
requirement that where an expert opinion or summary is based on
reports by others the reports must be produced. Some of these deci-
seldom attain the dignity of 'holdings'; they are usually only incidental tu a discussion of
the sufficiency of the proof."
71. 3 d. at 3060-1.
Rule 43(c), moreover, dealing with the record of excluded evidence--or offer of
proof-provides: "In actions tried without a jury the same procedure may Le followed,
except that the Court upon request shall take and report the evidence in full, unless it
dearly appears that the evidence is not admissible on any ground or that the witness is
privileged."
Wigmore stresses the absence of juries in his explanation of the latitude permitted
experts in patent litigation, as follows: "[I]n patent practice, the expert witnesses, nomi-
nally so-called, are virtually the retained partisan assistants of counsel, and yet no move-
ment of complaint is made against this method. The reason is the same though converse,
viz. that, in the absence of juries, the abuse is not felt." 2 W101toaE, EvIEMrc § 563 n.3
(3d ed. 1940).
A similar suggestion that considerable latitude should be permitted in the introduc-
tion of expert cost accounting studies in a proceeding in equity appears in 01do Assoc. Tel.
Co. v. Geiger, 3 F.Supp. 997, 1000-1 (S.D.Ohio 1933), a telephone rate case: "The facts
disclose that the witness Stump prepared his data of unit costs, including material, rate of
pay (about which there is no disagreement), and data of labor performance, from details
furnished by the engineers of the commission, and data that had been prepared, systema-
tized, redrafted, and scientifically treated through years of experience of the engineers and
accountants of the commission, dealing with appraisals and valuations of industries of this
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sions are cited in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America.2 The
disputed evidence in that case consisted in testimony by witnesses for
Alcoa described as "thoroughly qualified experts on subjects relating
to bauxite," concerning bauxite deposits of certain grades in Arkansas.
Their testimony and summaries were based on numerous test-boring
reports made by many drillers. The drillers were not produced, nor
were all of their reports. The government contended that the evidence
presented through these two experts therefore consisted in or relied
upon hearsay, and was in violation of the best evidence rule. But
Judge Caffey held this evidence admissible. 3 And in United States v.
class and of public utilities of all classes. This data was placed at the disposal of the
plaintiff's representatives. Certainly the experience of years of the commission's specialists,
in connection with a highly specialized element of utility evaluation, and which is one of
the particular concerns of the commission and its department, wherein the methods of
valuation are improved and systematized, ought to have probative value and effect ill a
court of equity responsible for valuation solutions in connection with rate litigation, Fair
opportunity for the company, through its experts, to examine the underlying data from
which the facts and mathematical calculations are drawn, should be sufficient in respect to
at equitable consideration of the rights of parties to render such evidence competent, of
course subject to its weight and credibility." (Italics supplied)
72. 35 F.Supp. 820 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (Government's motion to strike certain evidence
denied).
73. Id. at 823-7: "As I conceive, the law on the point may be briefly stated thus:
Opinion testimony by an acceptable expert resting wholly or partly on information, oral
or documentary, recited by him as gathered from others, which is trustworthy and which
is practically unobtainable by other means, is competent even though the first-hand sources
from which the information came be not produced in court. With respect to the matter, il
what impresses me as unambiguous authoritative judicial language, it has been said that
'the requisites of an exception of the hearsay rule' are 'necessity and circumstantial guar-
anty of trustworthiness.' G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Syndicate Pub. Co., 2 Cir., 207 F. 515,
518. In other words, when hearsay evidence is offered it is admissible if resort to it be
essential in order to discover the truth and if the surroundings persuade the court that
the information adduced by the expert as a basis of his opinion is reliable.
"In the Merriam case the opinion was written by Judge Learned Hand when a
District Judge. This was quoted in its entirety and, so far as pertinent here, was 'fully'
approved by the appellate court. He failed to find a court opinion directly stating the
proposition he announced. His sole reliance was 3 Wigmore on Evidence, 1st Ed., sees.
1421, 1422 and 1690, published in 1913 and still standing without substantial alteration.
With immaterial changes, the three sections mentioned have been carried forward in the
second edition, published in 1923, and in the third edition, published in 1940.
"As will be observed, Judge Hand's test consists of two things. For purposes of
identification these may be called (1) necessity and (2) trustworthiness. They will be
considered in reverse order.
"The second element (namely, trustworthiness) is easy of application. (See Wiginore
on Evidence, 3d Ed., Vol. V, sec. 1422; Vol. VI, sees. 1692 and 1702). That the material
resorted to by the experts in the case at bar as foundation for their opinions was trust-
worthy seems to me clear: indeed, so abundantly established by the record as to admit
of no real doubt.
"With respect to the first element (namely, necessity for using hearsay) there may be
room for different views as to how it should be applied and, as I feel, we cannot intelli-
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Mortimer, a summary compiled from tax records was admitted without
concomitant examination of the compilers.74
gently or safely apply it unless first we arrive at an exact understanding of what is meant
by 'necessity? I think, however, particularly as Wigmore was relied on by Judge Hand
as support for his statement of the reason of the rule, that we may rely on the learned
author for a precise definition.
"In effect, Wigmore says that, as the word necessity is here used, it is not to be inter-
preted as uniformly demanding a showing of total inaccessibility of first-hand evidence as
a condition precedent to the acceptance of a particular piece of hearsay, but that necessity
exists where otherwise great practical inconvenience would be experienced in making the
desired proof (Wigmore, 3d Ed., Vol. V, sec. 1421; Vol. VI, sec. 1702) .... If it were
otherwise, the result would be that the exception created to the hearsay rule vould thereby
be mostly, if not completely, destroyed.
"Perhaps an illustration may further elucidate the situation I am attempting to
describe.
"One main specific instance in the record of a hearsay objection by the Government
is where Alcoa had failed to produce third persons who drilled, or reports by drillers of,
test holes showing or laying the basis for determining quality and quantity of bauxite dis-
closed by the drilling to various distances below the surface on particular tracts of land in
Pulaski and Saline counties, Arkansas, referred to as the dumb bell. What are the perti-
nent facts as to whether non-production should be permitted?
"Among the facts for consideration in determining whether hearsay could properly be
used are these: In the dumb bell region it is and long has been the general custom to ac-
cept such test hole reports as correct without calling the makers to verify them (pp.
36555-61, 37467-9, 37587-99). They spread over many years. They run to large numbers.
The makers were numerous and are scattered. In order to supply the needed information
direct from persons with first-hand knowledge, or from writings shown to have b-en made
by them, on which to predicate an opinion, it is obvious that practically it would have ben
a physical impossibility to produce the makers or the documents at the trial of the case at
bar. Such circumstances, as I understand Vigmore, are sufficient to constitute necessity,
within the sense of the rule, for using hearsay in making proof of what is embodied in the
reports.
"When one reflects on how much time had already been consumed in the trial of
this case when the experts were called as witnesses and how much additional time would
have been required if they had not been allowed to resort to hearsay, certainly, if there
be any discretion vested in the trial judge, it cannot have been error for him to have
made 'a concession to the shortness of life' such as he did. Cf. United States v. Sccony-
Vacuum Co., 310 U.S. 150, 230. ... But if there exist no such discretion at least I thin!:
it not inapposite to express the view that failure to adopt the rule substantially as I have
phrased it would be inconsistent with the fundamental philosophy running through the
cases I have cited, more particularly through the opinions of the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals.
"As I feel also, the rule stated is the unavoidable outcome of analysis of the opinions
taken together in combination. Moreover, I believe that maintenance of it is demanded if
we are to respect a somewhat general but concrete admonition by the Supreme Court.
[Citing cases.] In substance, trial courts are there told to be practical and, so far as rea-
sonably possible, to harmonize their evidence rulings with the current habits of the people
generally in the communities in which they sit!'
74. 118 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 616 (1941), per Clark, C. J.:
"The most serious objection, technically, is that made to the admission in evidence of a
number of charts purporting to show defaults in the payment of taxes on a high propor-
tion of the mortgaged properties. These charts had been prepared by the prosecution Wit-
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The exception to the hearsay rule in favor of entries made in the
regular course of business normally contemplates the admission of
ness Karcher, an experienced public accountant, assisted by several aides, of whom only
one, in addition to Karcher, took the stand. One more seems to have been in the court
room; the others were outside the district and at a distance at the time of the trial. Tie
reliability of the charts is not questioned, and several of the defendants and their witnesses
checked the figures and found no disparity, rather, indeed, that Karcher had been very
fair. An exhibit by an expert for the defense-made up in the way appellant here criticizes
-tallies remarkably with Karcher's charts particularly when allowance is made for the
fact that it does not include the second half of the 1932 taxes. It did show that the ratio
of all arrears in taxes and interest to the principal amount in the important mortgage
series was less than 3 per cent, a matter not brought out by Karcher. But the number of
mortgages in arrears, not the total amount of the arrears, was the 'danger signal' United
-States v. Dilliard, supra, 110 F.2d at page 832. Appellant challenges the admission of the
charts on two grounds: that they were prepared from tax records not themselves in evi-
dence and that all those who participated in their preparation did not testify. Since the
facts could have been brought out in any event by lengthy trial processes, and since ap-
pellant had the benefit of all the aid in rebuttal which his expert could suggest, we might
well deny reversal merely for the lack of a showing of substantial injury. United States v.
Kelley, 2 Cir., 105 F.2d 912, 917. But we think the charts were admissible.
"The voluminous material summarized by the charts was itself extracted from a great
number of tax record books of each of the metropolitan counties. Not only would the pro-
duction of those books have been a practical impossibility, but the procurement of either
certified copies or title company abstracts, as authorized by New York Civil Practice Act,
...of those records, involving hundreds of parcels of land, would have been most expen-
sive, as well as disruptive of the activities of the record offices and burdensome upon the
court. Furthermore, the records themselves, in official custody, were equally open to
inspection by the defense. In such circumstances, secondary evidence is admissible to
prove their contents, as it would be if they were outside the jurisdiction of the court or
lost. ...
"But appellant argues most strenuously that all of Karcher's aides should have been
called. That this is a purely formal objection is shown by the testimony obtained from
the one aide who took the stand. He testified that he and another assistant had made up
the record cards, which he produced, covering their abstracts from the tax records on over
a thousand parcels. Thus the amenities were formally satisfied, but certainly appellant
was not the gainer, if, indeed, anyone was, by such routine testimony. Obviously the aildeq
saw only part of the picture. The authenticity of the whole must depend upon Xarcher's
supervision and direction. He should therefore be the testimony upon which its evidential
value rests. Karcher himself testified that he supervised the entire job, giving full time
from November, 1934, until June or July, 1935 and then for various periods until the fall
of 1937. First the arrears as shown by the company's own files were computed; then,
since these were not complete, he directed the check from the tax records according to a
plan which called for arrears of at least 30 days' duration, and resolved all doubtful ques-
tions in favor of defendants. We have seen that the results demonstrated the fairness of
his method.
"There are numerous cases holding admissible on the testimony of a supervising agent
statements compiled from voluminous records according to a method at once practicable
and offering reasonable guaranty of accuracy, even though the supervisor had not examined
each record himself. ...Obviously this rule loses none of its force by reason of the
passage of the recent statute, 28 U.S.C.A. 695, under which writings and records made in
the regular course of any business, where it is the regular course of such business to malze
them, are admissible in any court of the United States. See Ulm v. Moore-McCormach
Lines, Inc., 2 Cir., 115 F.2d 492; Id., 2 Cir., 117 F.2d 222. The only possible reason for
1246 [Vol. 58: 1242
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"original entries" only. This limitation, however, has often been re-
laxed.
75
Complexity of issues likewise works in favor of the admissibility
of expert opinion which might otherwise be deemed too speculative,
which touches an ultimate issue in the case, or which in a simpler case
might for other reasons be considered an invasion of the province of the
court. The latitude sometimes permitted experts in patent cases has
already been mentioned.7 6 On other types of issues experts have like-
wise been permitted considerable latitude, provided always that the
asserting that these authorities are not quite controlling is that these cannot be business
entries, since they were made in preparing evidence for this trial; and, indeed, the case of
Morton Butler Timber Co. v. United States, 6 Cir., 91 F.2d 84, 89, does say, as a ground
for affirming a ruling made below, that entries 'made apparently for exclusive use as
evidence in this case' were therefore not in the regular course of business. This ruling is,
however, condemned by %Vigmore as 'unsound; the men who made them were acting in
the regular course of their employment.' 5 Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed. 1940, 1530, pp.
384, 385. And it is opposed to the leading case of Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Keyes, supra,
where the tables in question were prepared for the particular case.
"On the principle we cannot see why an accountant's aides whose job it is to take
off material from the public records so that their chief may construct his tables and charts
accurately are not acting in the regular course of business. ... [Aiccuracy is the life of
an accountant's business, but the multitude of records cannot be checked by any one per-
son alone. And here the system followed w%-as not merely likely to insure accuracy, but
apparently did so, since the other side, far from discrediting the records, actually supported
them. The trend in the courts is unmistakably to follow the methods of ordinary business
in assuming the validity, until discredited, of records daily accepted in commercial routine."
75. In Cub Fork Coal Co. v. Fairmont Glass Co., 19 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1927), for
example, part of the plaintiff's problem was to prove that shortages in deliveries of coal
during three months were due to a shortage of coal cars on the C. & 0. Railroad. Evidence
on this issue held improperly excluded was described by the court as follows: "Error is
assigned over the rejection of evidence offered by the plaintiffs tending to establish a car
shortage. One Hodges who described himself as 'the statistician in charge of coal car
accounts' of the Chesapeake & Ohio railroad, testified that his company published monthly
bulletins showing the allotment of cars to coal companies for the succeeding 30 days. This
allotment was based upon the affidavits of the shippers and represented the latter's re-
quirements. From the records before him, he testified to the plaintiffs' allotments. He was
then asked to state the number of cars furnished during the months wherein plaintiffs
failed to ship defendant the 1,500 tons of coal. The objection to this question was sus-
tained, but not until the witness had testified that the record which he had in his possession
was made up in his office, and was based upon reports sent him, in the due course of busi-
ness, by one Malley, an employee of the railway whose position was described as 'a local
car distributor. 'Malley sent daily reports, which showed the 'ratings of the mines, cars,
orders, supplies, loadings, hours worked and cars billed east and west.' These daily re-
ports were preserved and on file with the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company. In the
due course of business the reports were transferred into permanent book form, and the
witness had this record, but not the daily mine reports, in court." Id. at 274-5.
76. See note 71 supra. In B. F. Sturtevant Co. v. Massachusetts Hair and Felt Co.,
122 F2d 900 (1st Cir. 1941), an expert on centrifugal fans was permitted to testify that in
his opinion the mechanism described in plaintiff's patents was not disclosed or suggested
in any of the prior art patents. In National Development Co. v. Lawson-Porter Shoe
Machinery Corp., 129 F.2d 255, 259 (1st Cir. 1942), the court observed that ".... plain-
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issue was sufficiently complex and the opinion of such a nature as to
be considered helpful. In Sheldon v. Moredall Realty Corp., the opinion
testimony of various directors and managers of other theatres was
received on the question of "the percentage of patrons who attended
the performance" because of "attractions on the program other than
the infringed play." 11 And in United States v. Appalachian Electric
Power Co.-a suit by the United States to enjoin the construction of a
dam and electric power plant on the New River-defendant was per-
mitted to introduce evidence of findings by the Federal Power Commis-
sion and the Chief of Engineers of the U. S. Army that the river was
not navigable (within the meaning of the Rivers and Harbors Act and
the Federal Water Power Act) at the point in question."
A. Use of Judicial Notice
As Thayer once observed: "Courts may judicially notice much
which they cannot be required to notice. That is well worth emphasiz-
ing; for it points to a great possible usefulness in this doctrine, in help-
ing to shorten and simplify trials." 11 The propriety of full use of this
simplifying process in any proceeding as involved as those of the anti-
trust type is probably obvious; and such utilization is facilitated by
the absence of a jury.8" Matter to be noticed may be inserted in a trial
tiff's machine... is a highly complex affair and the wording of the patent is such that
the services of experts were required to explain it to and interpret it for the court below."
The reception of such expert opinion was accordingly approved, And in Bailey v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 115 F.2d 904, 907 (9th Cir. 1940), the court approved the introduction of
"certain drawings explanatory of the very small drawings of the patents involved," those
introduced being "simplified" and "based upon the patent drawings and the description of
the drawings."
77. 29 F.Supp. 729, 732 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
78. 23 F.Supp. 83, 89 (W.D.Va. 1938), aff'd, 107 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1939), rev'd on
other grounds, 311 U.S. 377 (1940). The court then refers to a report to the Secretary of
War made in 1828 and transmitted to the House of Representatives, and two to the Army
Chief of Engineers made in 1876 and 1912, early historical %vorlks including an account of
an exploring trip made by John Peter Sully in 1742, and annual reports of the Army Chief
of Engineers. The court then says: "It is clear that the question of navigability is one of
fact which must be determined by the court upon all the evidence and that this duty
cannot be abdicated; nor is it performed by mere acceptance of the findings or opinions of
other persons no'matter how competent. But the determination of the issue of navigability
permits a wide range of testimony and coming permissibly within this range, I think, are
the opinions of persons who by training and experience are competent to speak. So far as
the official reports from which quotation has been made express opinions on the navigabil-
ity of the river, they are accepted merely as opinions to be considered with the other evi-
dence and given such weight as they may be deemed entitled to. With the same thought in
mind, the court permitted witnesses to testify at the trial giving their opinions on the issue
of navigability." Id. at 97-8.
79. 9 WIGmORE, EviDENca § 2583 (3d ed. 1940).
80. See Strahorn, The Process of Judicial Notice, 14 VA. L. Rnv. 544, 551 (1928)
"More things are judicially noticed by the judge on request than will be permitted to
come within the scope of jury notice."
1248 [Vol. 58: 1242
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brief, included in the testimony of an expert, or otherwise brought to
the court's attention. In support of this process it may be pointed out
that judicial notice does not preclude an opportunity on the part of the
adverse party to question the accuracy of matter submitted for notice
by offering evidence to the contrary.8
General Scope of Judicial Notice: The appropriate scope of judicial
notice is implicit in what has already been said. The following formula-
tions of the criteria of facts which may be judicially noticed are rep-
resentative. Wigmore's is as follows:
"(1) Matters which are actually so notorious to all that the produc-
tion of evidence would be unnecessary; (2) Mlatters which the judi-
cial function supposes the judge to be acquainted with, in theory at
least; (3) Sundry matters not included under either of these heads;
they are subject for the most part to the consideration that though
they are neither actually notorious nor bound to be judicially
known, yet they would be capable of such instant and unquestion-
able demonstration, if desired, that no party would think of impos-
ing a falsity on the tribunal in the face of an intelligent adver-
sary." 82
Strahorn suggests the following criteria: (1) common kmowledge;
(2) universal notoriety; (3) ease of precise ascertainment; and (4) im-
possibility of bona fide dispute8 3
Standard Works in Aid qf Judicial Notice: Standard Works of various
kinds-histories, encyclopedias, scientific treatises or manuals, trade
publications and price current lists, etc.-are sometimes admitted in
evidence, and sometimes employed in aid of judicial notice." Even
when treated as evidence there would presumably be no necessity for
a preliminary showing of authenticity when the standard and ac-
cepted character of the publication in the profession or trade is judi-
cially known to the court.3
Specific Kinds of Facts Noticed: "Courts are found noticing, from
time to time, a varied array of unquestionable facts, ranging through-
81. 9 WIGmoRE, EvinmxcE § 2567 (3d ed. 1940).
82. 9 id. § 2571.
81 Strahorn, supra note SO, at 548.
84. 6 WIG o E, EviWENcE § 1699 (3d ed. 1940).
85. The opinions in the following cases illustrate the use of standard works in aid of
judicial notice: Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 393 (1934) (various
histories of the United States quoted with reference to former financial depressions);
Steenerson v. Great Northern Ry., 69 Minn. 353, 72 N.W. 713 (1897) (with reference to
reasonable income on a railroad investment, facts and economic propositions cited from the
Yale Review, The Losidon Economist, Bradstreet's Journal, the Ba;hcr's Magazine, and
the works of J. S. fill, Adam Smith, and David A. Vells); Parmalce v. Ulnited States,
113 F2d 729 (App.D.C. 1940) (publications of psychologists, zgciologists and historians
judicially noticed in majority opinion as bearing on the meaning of the statutory standard
in a proceeding to confiscate certain allegedly obscene books imported from England).
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out the data of commerce, industry, history, and natural science." 10
These have included such general economic conditions as the danger
of inflation at the time of enactment of the Emergency Price Control
Act,87 crop failures by reason of drought, storms or hail in large areas
of the United States during 1930,88 collapse of the Florida land boom in
1927 and previous period of speculation, 0 and depression in the mining
business during the latter part of 1921.10 They have included facts
bearing on the competitive situation in an industry such as that the
facilities of a ferry company had been rendered obsolete by construc-
tion of an international bridge and tunnel,0 1 that the anthracite industry
was suffering severe competition from other fuels during a certain
period, 92 and that the fact that any one can acquire, ship and compete
with established maritime carriers is often disadvantageous to both
carriers and shippers.0 3 They have included such special conditions or
problems affecting a particular industry or business at a.particular
time, as that subsequent to the entry of an order tremendous changes
had occurred affecting all companies in the rubber industry, 4 and
that in anthracite regions breakers are shut down for long periods of
time because of lack of orders." They have included such technological
facts as that a patented device so resembled an ice cream freezer as not
to constitute an invention,8 and that a patented process constituted a
mere application of "well known scientific principles" rather than an
invention.Y Such financial facts as the course of interest rates have also
been noticed."8
B. Admissibility of Usual Source Materials
Entries in the Regular Course of Business: The exception to the hear-
say rule in favor of business entries is in a federal proceeding governed
by Section 1732 of the new Title 28 of the United States Code:
"In any court of the United States and in any court established
86. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2580 (3d ed. 1940).
87. See Rottenberg v. United States, 137 F.2d 850, 856 (lst Cir. 1943).
88. Person v. United States, 112 F.2d 1, 2 (8th Cir. 1940).
89. Rhodes v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 100 F.2d 966, 970 (6th Cir. 1939).
90. Morris-Poston Coal Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 42 F.2d 620, 622
(6th Cir. 1930).
91. Walling v. Patton-Tully Transp. Co., 134 F.2d 945, 947 (6th Cir. 1943).
92. State Line & S. R.R. v. Phillips, 17 F.Supp. 607, 610 (M.D.Pa. 1937).
93. McCormick S. S. Co. v. United States, 16 F.Supp. 45, 48 (N.D.Cal. 1936).
94. National Labor Relations Board v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 129 F.2d 661,
667 (5th Cir. 1942).
95. John Conlon Coal Co. v. Rochester American Ins. Co. of New York, 16 F.Supp.
93, 95 (M.D.Pa. 1935).
96. Brown v. Piper, 91 U.S. 37 (1875).
97. Luten v. Allen, 254 Fed. 587 (D.Kan. 1918), aff'd, 263 Fed. 986 (8th Cir. 1920).
98. See Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 120 F.2d 625, 633
(7th Cir. 1941).
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by Act of Congress any writing or record, whether in the form of an
entry in a book or otherwise, made as a memorandum or record of
any act, transaction, occurrence, or event, shall be admissible as
evidence of said act, transaction, occurrence, or event, if made in
regular course of any business, and if it was the regular course of
such business to make such memorandum or record at the time of
such act, transaction, occurrence, or event or within a reasonable
time thereafter.
"All other circumstances of the maling of such writing or record,
including lack of personal knowledge by the entrant or maker, may
be shown to affect its weight, but such circumstances shall not affect
its admissibility.
"The term 'business', as used in this section, includes business,
profession, occupation, and calling of every kind." '
The language of Section 1732-"any writing or record, whether in
the form of an entry in a book or otherwise, made as a memorandum
or record of any act, transaction, occurrence, or event,"-makes it
clear that the statute is not limited to books of account and financial
records. Nor has the language been construed to exclude government
records."' 0 One limitation on the language "a memorandum or record
of any act, transaction, occurrence, or event" is suggested in the Pol-
lack case: 101
99. 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1948), supplanting § 695 of old Title 28. There was some con-
flict between the circuits as to the construction of subdivision (h) of this section's prede-
cessor, Section 695, which read as follows: "Sections 695-695h of this title shall be pros-
pective only, and not retroactive." 49 STAT. 1564 (1936). The prevailing and more
probable interpretation was that the statute governed all proceedings instituted after its
enactment, irrespective of whether the records offered were made prior or subsequent to
June 20, 1936. Landay v. United States, 103 F.2d 698, 705 (6th Cir. 1939), cert. de iecd,
309 U.S. 681 (1940) ; Ilseng v. United States, 120 F.2d 823, 826 (9th Cir. 1941), ccrt. dc-
nied, 314 U.S. 665 (1941) ; see Shreve v. United States, 103 F.2d 796, 810 (9th Cir. 1939)
(by implication), ccrt. denied, 308 U.S. 570 (1939). Compare Hass v. United States, 93
F.2d 427, 437 (8th Cir. 1937) (suggesting that the statute governs a proceeding initiated
by indictment prior to the enactment of the statute, the trial being subsequent), wi r Valli
v. United States, 94 F.2d 687, 693 (1st Cir. 1933), ccrt. de nicd, 304 U.S. S5 (1933) (treat-
ing the statute as inapplicable to records made prior to its enactment).
100. See cases cited infra. A rubber stamped notation "air mail" placed on an envelope
by a recipient trust company, birth certificates and hospital records, memoranda and letters
of corporate officers, and rekordak facsimiles of checks, have all been treated as within
the scope of the statute. United States v. Leathers, 135 F2d 507, 510 (2d Cir. 1943) (air
mail stamp); Pollack v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 13S F.2d 123, 123 (3d Cir. 1943)
(child's birth certificate and hospital records to prove parent's age) ; Ulm v. Moore-Mfc-
Cormack Lines, 115 F.2d 492, 494 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denicd, 313 U.S. 567 (1941) (hos-
pital records to prove nature and scope of injuries); Overfield v. Pennroad Corp., 42
F.Supp. 586, 628 (E.D.Pa. 1941) (memoranda and letters of corporate officials); United
States v. Manton, 107 F2d 834, 844 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denicd, 309 U.S. 6C4 (1940) (re.
kordak facsimiles of checks).
101. Pollack v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 133 F.2d 123, 128 (3d Cr. 1943).
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"Certainly it cannot be said that the only entry admissible under
the statute is the notation that a child was born ...
"We need not pass upon the question how far beyond the fact of
a child's birth such entries may go before they cease to be included
as a record of an 'act, transaction, occurrence, or event.! If informa-
tion called for related to a parent's religion, political affiliations or
economic status, a more difficult question would be presented."
The statute further provides that so long as a given entry or record
was made in the regular course of business and contemporaneously
with the event recorded, "All other circumstances . ..may be shown
to affect its weight, but . .. shall not affect its admissibility." Sit-
uations in which a court might be reluctant to take this language lit-
erally, however, can be imagined; and some have occurred. In the
Pollack case, for example, Magruder, C. J., dissented from the majority
decision admitting a child's birth certificate and hospital records to
prove a parent's age, on the ground that neither the hospital nor the
registrar of vital satistics would ordinarily have knowledge of the fact.
In United States v. Kelley "I the court dealt with an inventory prepared
by government accountants of Ringling Brothers' property as of 1935
(offered in a prosecution for assisting in the preparation of fraudulent
income tax returns) as follows:
"The items entered upon it appear to have been noted down by the
two accountants from personal knowledge, gained on the ground,
and we can see no reason why the document was not pro tanto com-
petent. However, the values set opposite the items, though likewise
gathered on the spot, were, in part at any rate, gleaned by inquiry
from unascertained persons, who may or may not have been quali-
fied, and who certainly were not called. So far it was incompetent,
and the values have been excluded." 103
The limitation of the statute to entries made "in regular course of
any business" was construed in Palmer v. Hoffman 114 to exclude records
made primarily for use in litigation rather than for other purposes
incident to the conduct and operation of a business. Regularity of
preparation is thus not the whole test of admissibility. The act covers
entries which constitute "routine reflections of the day to day opera-
tions of a business." '15 This is a narrower interpretation than that
suggested by Clark, C. J., in United States v. Mortimer."' Beyond the
fact that in both cases the questioned documents were prepared for use
in litigation, the two decisions are quite distinguishable on their facts.
102. 105 F.2d 912 (2d Cir. 1939).
103. Id. at 917.
104. 318 U.S. 109 (1943) (excluding the written statement of a deceased railroad en-
gineer made in his regular line of duty describing an accident).
105. Id. at 114.
106. 118 F2d 266, 269 (2d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 616 (1941).
[Vol.58: 12421252,
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The Palmer decision does, however, cast some doubt on the discussion
of the scope of the statute contained in the Ml1orlimer opinion.
Generally speaking, the statute has not altered the familiar require-
ment that documents offered under this hearsay exception must be
"books of original entry" or "the first permanent record" of a trans-
action. 10
7
But decisions like that of Judge Caffey in the Alcoa case, discussed
supra, and others presently to be discussed which permit the intro-
duction of summaries based on voluminous original entries which are
neither put in evidence nor made available for inspection, are in effect
a relaxation of this requirement.
Production of all who participated in the transaction or making of
the record is unnecessary. In Palmer v. Hoffman, the Court made it
clear that the purpose of the act was to dispense with any necessity for
calling as witnesses those who at all stages had a part in the transaction
recorded, or in the making of the record. Testimony by "the one who
superintended the making of the records" is sufficient."'
Official Records and Reports: Certified copies of a considerable variety
of official registers, reports, and returns are expressly declared by piece-
meal federal as well as state legislation to be admissible as evidence of
facts therein stated. Beyond this, there is the familiar hearsay ex-
ception in favor of official written statements. The area of greatest
uncertainty has to do with the class of official statements most likely
to be of use in making economic proof, namely, official reports emanat-
ing from administrative agencies.
The difficulty with such reports arises out of the fact that they are
usually not simple records of a transaction done by the recording
official or his subordinates, and not limited to facts within their personal
knowledge. Typically, they are the product of investigation and re-
search. The general criteria of admissibility applicable to official re-
ports of this nature have been discussed by Wigmore.O His general
107. See Tracy, The Introduction of Documentary Evidence, 24 Iowa L. Rnv. 436,
455-6; Landay v. United States, 108 F2d 698 (6th Cir. 1939) ; and John Irving Shoe Co.,
Inc. v. Dugan, 93 F.2d 711, 713 (1st Cir. 1937) (holding that to prove the cost of work
done and commissions earned, an itemized bill sent to the defendant was not admissible,
the worksheets from which plaintiff's bookkeeper made up the bill being neither produced,
offered for inspection, nor their absence accounted for).
108. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 112-13 (1943). See also Landay v. United
States, 108 F.2d 698 (6th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 681 (1940), and the discussion
by Clark, C. J., in United States v. Mortimer, 118 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1941), cert. denied,
314 U.S. 616 (1941).
As to foundation requirements generally see United States v. Feinberg, 140 F.2d 592
(2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 726 (1944) (books of account stipulated to be Looks
of the corporation "subject to verification"), and Tracy, op. cit. supra note 107.
109. See 5 \VIGMORF, EVmIENcE § 1635 (3d ed. 1940) at p. 531; and § 1670, at pp. 672-7,
as follows: "Now there may be cases in which the officer's duty clearly does involve his
ascertainment of facts occurring out of his presence and requiring his resort to sources of
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conclusion from a review of the cases is that "the tendency of the
Courts is to disapprove rather than to favor the admission of such re-
ports or inquisitions, and to require a clear showing of an express
authority to investigate and report." 110
Reported decisions on reports containing economic data are rela-
tively few. Census reports are admissible to prove the general facts
reported, though ordinarily not the facts relating to a particular in-
dividual, business or instance."' Similarly, general facts susceptible
of reasonably objective ascertainment, and reported in the publi-
cations of other supposedly reliable investigating agencies of the fed-
eral and state governments, are likewise usually considered admis-
sible.11 2 Reports which fail to qualify under the official statements
information other than his own senses of observation; for example, an assessor's record of
the value of real estate and of its occupancy, or a registrar of voters' record of electors'
residences. When such a duty dearly exists, the general doctrine above, that a witness
should have personal knowledge, need not stand in the way, for (as already noted) it has
its conceded limitations and where the officer is vested with a duty to ascertain for him-
self by proper investigation, this duty should be sufficient to override the general principle.
It is true that due caution should be observed before reaching the conclusion that the law
has in fact in a given case intended to invest the officer with such an unusual duty. But
when it clearly appears that a duty has been prescribed to investigate and to record or
certify facts ascertained other than by personal observation, then it follows that, in accord-
ance with the general principle of the present exception, the statement thus made becomes
admissible ...
"Now an inquisition or report, if made under due authority, stands upon no less favor-
able a footing than other official statements. As a statement made under official authority
or duty, it is admissible under the general principle (ante, §§ 1633, 1635): 1824, Mr.
Thomas Startde, Evidence, 260: 'Inquisitions, which are of a public nature, and taken
under competent authority, to ascertain a matter of public interest, are, upon principles
already announced, admissible in evidence against all the world .... It is not essential to
the reception of evidence of this nature that the inquiry should have been made by virtue of
some judicial authority and by means of witnesses examined upon oath; it is sufficient
if it was made by virtue of competent authority on behalf of the public, and on a subject-
matter of public interest. . . .It is, however, of the very essence of evidence of this na-
ture that the inquiry should have been made under proper authority; in general, therefore,
unless the authority be in its nature notorious, it must be proved by the production of the
commission; as in the case of an inquisition "post mortem" and such private offices.'"
110. 5 id. § 1672, at p. 699.
111. 5 id. § 1671, at pp. 685-6.
112. In United States v. American Tobacco Co., 39 F.Supp. 957 (E.D.Ky. 1941) (on
objection to evidence), for example, the District Court admitted Internal Revenue reports
showing the production of leading cigarette brands, a tabulation contained in the Federal
Trade Commission's Agricultural Income Study showing the volume of sales of ten-cent
brands, and reports of leaf tobacco prices from the Department of Agriculture's Yearbooks,
Mimeographed Transcript, pp. 5643-72, 5475, 5507-12. However, with respect to an NRA
Tobacco Study published in 1935, dealing comprehensively with conditions and practices
in the industry, the court took a different view. This report had been prepared by a small
staff under the supervision of Merle D. Vincent as Coordinator and Director of Industry
Studies, and was based on data obtained from leading concerns in the industry, reports
from Internal Revenue, Agriculture, Commerce, FTC and Labor, and from tobacco trade
publications. Staff members had also made independent field investigations of wholesale,
[Vol. 58: 12421254
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hearsay exception may still be utilized within certain limits by a
properly qualified expert as a part of the basis for his estimates, gen-
eralizations, or opinions. 3
Trade Publications and Market Reports: A hearsay exception in
favor of certain classes of commercial and professional lists, registers
and reports is well recognized." 4 Accredited price lists and market
reports are the most commonly admitted., When the court is not
jobbing and retail practices. Testifying as "an expert in analyzing and studying the in-
dustry," id. at 5305, Vincent identified and described the Study. It was not offered in evi-
dence, but the following colloquy concerning it occurred:
"The Court: I don't know, what his NRA report was.
"Q.: It has not been offered in evidence.
"The Court: It obviously would not be competent, but it may enable him to
identify his factual basis with the facts that are in this case." Id. at 5337.
The types of official statements most commonly discussed in the reported federal opin-
ions are as follows: United States v. Sussman, 37 F.Supp. 294 (E.D.Pa. 1941) (certificate
that search of the records of the SEC failed to disclose registration, admitted) ; United
States v. Ifeyer, 113 F2d 387, 397 (7th Cir. 1940) (chart compiled by government agents
based on records of the United States' engineer, admitted) ; United States v. Appalachian
Electric Power Co., 23 F.Supp. 83 (W.D.Va. 193S), aff'd, 107 F2d 769 (4th Cir. 1939),
rev'd on other grounds, 311 U.S. 377 (1940) (official reports to and by the Army Chief
of Engineers concerning the navigability of a stream, admitted) ; Lloyd Sabaudo v. Elting,
55 F.2d 1048, 1050 (2d Cir. 1932) (certificates of U.S. medical examiners, admitted-
immigration case) ; Buckley v. United States, 4 How. 250 (U.S. 1846) (official appraiser's
appraisal of goods imported, return admitted--customs case) ; see United States v. Bud:,
70 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1934) (official reports of examining physician, but not affidavits,
admitted-war risk insurance case).
This whole subject is dealt with in the proposed Uniform Act for the Use of Official
Reports as Evidence, adopted in 1936 by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws. See 5 WiGmoRx, EvancE § 1673 (3d ed. 1940) at p. 703:
"An Act to Make Uniform the Use of Oficial Reports as Ezidence. Section 1. (Of-
ficial Reports). Written reports or findings of fact made by officers of this State on a
matter within the scope of their duty as defined by statute shall, insofar as relevant, be
admitted as evidence of the matters stated therein.
"Section 2. (Notice Before Trial). Such report or finding shall be admissible only if
the party offering it has delivered a copy of it or so much thereof as may relate to the
controversy, to the adverse party a reasonable time before trial, unless in the opinion of
the trial Court the adverse party has not been unfairly surprised by the failure to deliver
such copy.
"Section 3. (Cross-Examination). Any adverse party may cross-examine any person
making such reports or findings or any person furnishing information used therein; but
the fact that such testimony may not be obtainable shall not affect the admissibility of the
report or finding, unless, in the opinion of the Court, the adverse part), is unfairly preju-
diced thereby."
113. See Subdivision "D" of this part of the article, infra.
114. 6 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE §§ 1702-S (3d ed. 1940) at pp. 22-39.
115. Virginia v. West Virginia, 238 U.S. 202, 212 (1915) (quotations in the Richmond
Times Dispatch admitted to prove value of railway stock) ; Cliquot's Champagne, 3 Wall.
114, 140 (U.S. 1865) (French price current lists admitted to prove wholesale price in
France) ; Coplin v. United States, 18 F.2d 652, 669 (9th Cir. 1937), cert. dcn:icd, 301 U.S.
703 (1937) (quotation sheets of Seattle Mining Exchange admitted to evidence prices);
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in a position to notice an offered publication's standard and accepted
character in the trade, foundation testimony is of course required.11
There are, of course, many other kinds of trade publications, reports,
and the like, which may fulfill the requirements already indicated.
As Wigmore points out: "The present principle is capable of liberal
expansion to include other classes of commercial and industrial records,
made by persons disinterested in the particular litigation, published
or kept accessible to third persons, and customarily relied upon by
them in the conduct of particular occupations." 117
Bausch Mach. Tool Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 79 F.2d 217, 226 (2d Cir. 1935)
(copies of The London Times admitted to show the price of aluminum in England) ; The
Blandon, 39 F.2d 933, 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1929), aff'd, 42 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1930) (Spanish
trade journal admitted to show value of nitrate in Spain) ; Rice v. Eisner, 16 F.2d 358, 361
(2d Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 764 (1927) ("bid and asked" quotations from ac-
cepted financial journals admitted).
116. In Harris v. United States, 48 F.2d 771, 778-9 (9th Cir. 1931), involving the
admissibility of a guide of stocks used for trading on the New York Produce Exchange,
for example, a ruling sustaining the exclusion of this guide laid down the following founda-
tion requirements:
"Frank Hammond, a witness called for the defense, testified that, as receiver for the
West Coast Finance Company, a certain book which is marked Defendants' Exhibit A-43
had come into his possession. He testified: 'This exhibit is a securities guide of stocks
used for trading on the New York Produce Exchange.'
"The first question presented is whether or not the above statement of the witness is
sufficient foundation for admitting the guide book. In Whelan v. Lynch, 60 N.Y. 474, 19
Am. Rep. 202, dealing with the admissibility of shipping and price current list, cited
by the Supreme Court, as above stated, and also referred to by Wigmore in his work on
Evidence, vol. 3, § 1703, it was said: 'The court was also in error, I think, in admitting
_he Shipping and Price Current List as evidence of the value of the wool, without some
proof showing how or in what manner it was made up; where the information it contained
was obtained, or whether the quotations of prices made were derived from actual sales, or
otherwise. It is not plain how a newspaper, containing the price current of merchandise,
of itself, and aside from any explanation as to the authority from which it was obtained,
can be made legitimate evidence of the facts stated. The accuracy and correctness of such
publications depend entirely upon the sources from which the information is derived.'"
See also Von Reitzenstein v. Tomlinson, 249 N.Y. 60, 162 N.E. 584, 585 (1928), re-
jecting reports of "National Quotation Bureau" containing bid and asked quotations on
certain bonds and shares, because "There is no evidence that its employees did their work
correctly. There is none that its price lists are generally recognized or acted upon as accu-
rate by dealers in the market. This at least must be proved before quotations, not other-
wise authenticated, became evidence of value . . . all that we have here is the fact that the
Bureau sells its service to subscribers in numbers not disclosed."
117. 6 W rmoRE, EvmaxcE § 1708 (3d ed. 1940) at p. 38.
The following decisions illustrate the possibility: People v. Eppinger, 105 Cal. 36, 38
Pac. 538 (1894) (city directory, to prove non-existence of firm bearing certain name);
Donoghue v. Smith, 114 Conn. 64, 157 Atl. 415 (1931) (probable duration of plaintiff's
life could be proved by standard mortality tables) ; Baum v. Stall, 163 Md. 153, 161 Atl.
244 (1932) (race chart compiled by Associated Press and printed in newspaper, to show
races run and horses running on a certain day) ; Slocovich v. Ins. Co., 108 N.Y. 56, 14
N.E. 802 (1888) (American Lloyds and other shipping registers, to show condition, ca-
pacity, age, and value of ships) ; Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Sheppard, 56 Ohio St.
(Vol. 58: 12421256
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Standard Works and Scientific Treatises: Apart from a few jurisdic-
tions, the courts have been reluctant to recognize a hearsay exception
for litigation generally in favor of standard treatises."', The argument
on principle for acceptance of apparently reliable expert hearsay has
been developed by XVigmore "9 and Judge L. Hand. -'1 But as the de-
cisions stand the hearsay exception is clearly established only as to
mortality tables, almanacs, sundry scientific tables, dictionaries,
histories (to prove facts of general history), and works of general lit-
erature (to prove literary usage and definitions).12 Beyond this,
standard works are employed much more freely in aid of judicial notice,
or as "ancient reputation" evidence of matters of general interest.
But general discussions of this principle of the law of evidence-
whether in treatises like that of Wigmore, or in the opinions of the
appellate courts-contemplate jury trial and speak from the frame of
reference which includes it. When the jury is excluded, the reactions
of the district court and of the circuit court of appeals in the Appa-
lachian Electric Power Co. case 122 are more representative.
Patents and Patent Office Records: To the extent that patents or the
originals of any documents and records in the possession of the Patent
Office would be admissible, their contents may be proven as provided
in Federal Rule 44, dealing with "Proof of Official Record." But
existing provisions of the United States Code relating to proof of pat-
ents and patent office records are not superseded, and proof may also
be made according to their provisions.
2 1
68, 46 N.E. 61 (annual reports of the American Trotting Ass'n, to shiow speed record of
a certain horse).
118. 6 WVIGITORE, EvmNac § 1690 (3d ed. 1940) at p. 2. The federal decisions most
favorable to such recognition are United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 23
F.Supp. 803 (W.D.Va. 1938), aff'd, 107 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1939), rm'd on othcr grou ds,
311 U.S. 377 (1940); G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Syndicate Pub. Co., 207 Fed. 515 (2d Cir.
1913) (admitting the author's statement of his sources contained in the preface to Ogilvie's
Imperial Dictionary published in 1850) ; and Western .Asurance Co. v. Mohlman Co, 83
Fed. 811 (2d Cir. 1897), cert. dcnied, 163 U.S. 710 (1897) (civil enginer rermitted on di-
rect to read excerpts from Kent's Mcchanical Engincers Pocket Boo., and Johnson's
Strainis in Frame Structure).
119. 6 VIGmops, Ev iDNcE §§ 1690-1701 (3d ed. 1940).
120. See G. & C. Merriam Co. v. S ndicate Pub. Co., 207 Fed. 515 (24 Cir. 1913).
121. 6 WiGMopx EvizxNcE §§ 1693-9 (3d ed. 1940).
122. 23 F.Supp. 83 (W.D.Va. 1938), aft'd, 107 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1939), rc,'d on othcr
grounds, 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
123. See Committee INote to Rule 44, 5 foorE, Ff-tr.aRA Pm ncr 079 (1938).
The relevant United States Code provisions are contained in Sections 1744-6 of the new
Title 28, and Section 47 of Title 35.
Section 1744 of Title 28 places on the same evidential f, oting as originals written or
printed copies. (when authenticated by the seal of the Patent Office and certified by the
Commissioner of Patents or attested in his name by his designated chief of divisicn) of (1)
records, books, papers, or drawings belonging to the Patent Office, (2) letters patent, and
(3) certificates of registration of trademarks, labels, or prints. Section 1745 of the Eame
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C. Specially Prepared Material
The principle is clearly established that trial judges have wide
discretion to permit the use of prepared or pre-digested material (as
distinguished from responsive oral answers to interrogation by coun-
sel in open court, and from original source data) "when reasonably
helpful under the particular circumstances." 124
Summaries: Where facts in issue can only be ascertained by the
inspection of voluminous records, papers, books of account, or other
data, the best evidence rule will be relaxed, and an oral or written sum-
mary allowed in evidence. 2 5 The question is when the original sources
thus summarized must be already in evidence, or at least available
to the opposing party. But however this may be determined, it is
clear that the original sources must be of an admissible character. 
120
title provides that the printed copies of specifications and drawings of patents, which the
Commissioner is authorized to print for gratuitous distribution, shall be admissible as evi-
dence of all matters therein contained when certified by the Commissioner and authenti-
cated by the seal of his office. With respect to the authentication of such copies, ". . . it
is enough that the copy offered purports to be printed by authority of the government; its
genuineness is assumed without further evidence." 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1684 (3d ed.
1940) at p. 843.
35 U.S.C. § 47 (1946) provides that assignments of patents and of applications for
patent may be proved as follows: "If any such assignment, grant, or conveyance of any
application for patent or patent shall be acknowledged before any notary public of the
several States or Territories or the District of Columbia, or any commissioner of any
court of the United States for any District or Territory, or before any secretary of lega-
tion or consular officer authorized to administer oaths or perform notarial acts under sec-
tion 1750 of the Revised Statutes (U.S.C., title 22, sec. 131) the certificate of such ac-
knowledgement, under the hand and official seal of such notary or other officer, shall be
prima facie evidence of the execution of such assignment, grant, or conveyance. As
amended Aug. 18, 1941, c. 370, 55 Stat. 634."
Proof of foreign letters patent is governed by Section 1746 of the new Title 28, which
provides that: "Copies of the specifications and drawings of foreign letters patent, certified
as provided in Section 1744 of this litle, shall be prima facie evidence of the fact of the
granting of such letters patent and of the date and contents thereof."
But a foreign patent may also be proved in the manner indicated in Schoerken v. Swift
& Courtney & Beecher Co., 7 Fed. 469 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1881) (copy of a French patent,
certified by the director of the national conservatory of arts and manufactures, tinder its
seal, and verified by the ministers of agriculture and commerce, and of foreign affairs, 'Un-
der their seals, but not under the great seal of France, admitted-on the ground that the
mode of authentication was equivalent to that prescribed by § 892 REv. STAT., forerunner
of Section 1744.
124. MORGAN & MAGUIIE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1942), sup-
plementary note at 288-92.
125. See Dewey, Best Evidence Ride-Use of Summaries of Voluminous Orighials, 37
MICH. L. Rmv. 449 (1939) ; 4 WIGMAORE, EviDENCE § 1230 (3d ed. 1940) at pp. 434-41.
126. Morton Butler Timber Co. v. United States, 91 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1937); Phillips
v. United States, 201 Fed. 259 (8th Cir. 1912). Wigmore states generally: "Most courts
require, as a condition, that the mass summarily testified to shall, if the occasion seems to
require it, be placed at hand in court, or at least be made accessible to the opposing party,
in order that the correctness of the evidence may be tested by inspection if desired, or
1258 [(Vol. 58: 1242
HeinOnline  -- 58 Yale L. J. 1258 1948-1949
1949] THE TRIAL OF ECONOMIC ISSUES OF FACT: 11 12159
The foundation will usually be considered sufficient: (1) where the
source data is produced in court, but not offered in e-vidence, 1' or (2)
where it is made available to the opposing party for purposes of check,
and cross-examination, but not produced in court because of practical
inconvenience, '2" or (3) where the source data consists of public records,
not produced but equally available to the parties. 1' -  Where the original
source data cannot feasibly be made available for inspection, but where
it appears that it would be of an admissible nature if available, an
expert summary may still be allowed in evidence, following the reason-
ing of Judge Caffey in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America.12 1
Here, however, the rulings are conflicting. The case for admissibility
is strongest where the summary in question was compiled in the reg-
ular course of business rather than merely for purposes of trial, for in
that event all that is required is a relaxation of the "first permanent
record" requirement. Admissibility also seems indicated where the
summary was compiled by an expert thoroughly qualified to interpret
the variety of source data in question."'
Tabulations, Charts, Etc.: Many rulings, as well as the daily practice
of trials, sustain the admissibility of charts, maps, photographs, tabu-
lations, and other devices for visual presentation, when properly veri-
fied, and as long as they contribute to a clear presentation of the
facts.13
2
Prepared TVritten Statements: Federal Rule 43(a) provides that:
"In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open
court, unless otherwise provided by these rules." The suggested pref-
that the material for cross-examination may be available... ." 4 WzoGioaE, Eviuz:.cz
§ 1230 (3d ed. 1940) at pp. 434-5.
127. Elmer Co. v. Kemp, 67 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1933) ; Butler v. United States, 53 F-2d
800 (10th Cir. 1931); and Lemon v. United States, 164 Fed. 953 (Sth Cir. 1903).
128. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Collins-Dietz-Mlorris Co., SO F2d 441
(10th Cir. 1935) ; Esternman-Nerkamp Co. v. Rouse, 2M1 Ky. 791, 278 S.A. 124 (1925);
Edelen v. Muir, 163 Ky. 685, 174 S.W. 474 (1915).
129. United States v. Mfortimer, 118 F2d 266 (2d Cir. 1941), cert. denicd, 314 U.S. 616
(1941) (tax records) ; Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mutual Casualty Ins. Co. v.
Messenger, 29 A.2d 653 (Md. 1943) (U.S. Geodetic Survey maps).
130. 35 F. Supp. 820 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (Government's motion to strike certain evidence
denied).
131. Compare Berthold-Jennings Lumber Co. v. St. Louis, I. 1. & S. Ry., SO F.2d 32
(8th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 297 U.S. 715 (1936) (excluding an accountant's incomplete
summary of certain ledger entries, the ledgers having been destroyed), uilh Greenbaum
v. United States, 93 F.2d 574, 578 (9th Cir. 1938) (accounting records which were not the
"original" or "first permanent" entries held properly admitted).
132. 3 WGmopE, EvmFaxcE §§ 791-798a (3d ed. 1940) at pp. 173-203; oVlor~a: & MA-
GuIrF, CAsEs Alm MATEALs oN Evmraca 290-2 (2d ed. 1942); United States v. Par:
Avenue Pharmacy, 56 F.2d 753, 756 (2d Cir. 1932) (chart shov.ing graphically how alleged
conspirators withdrew liquor from storage) ; Stone v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R, 53 F2d
813 (8th Cir. 1931) (photograph) ; Kalovsky v. Meyer Dairy Products Co., 30 Ohio App.
118, 122, 124, 164 N.E. 370, 372 (1928) (map).
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erence for hearing witnesses orally in open court is understandable for
reasons too obvious to require discussion. But where a mass of data
to be presented is voluminous and complex, and in the absence of a
jury, the use of a prepared written statement in lieu of oral testimony
by an expert would appear to be within the discretion of the court, by
analogy to the principles sanctioning the use of oral summaries of
complex data and of visual pictorial devices. 3
D. Expert Opinion
Opinion evidence on a given issue is appropriate "when the facts
can be interpreted and conclusions be drawn only by a person having
technical qualifications or special opportunities for knowledge not
possessed by the average layman." 134 The broad formula employed
in the proposed Uniform Expert Testimony Act is "Whenever . ..
issues arise upon which the Court deems expert evidence is desirable
... 1" 135 The decision on the experiential qualifications of an ex-
pert witness is ordinarily "a concrete one, i.e., upon the fitness of the
individual witness, as shown by the circumstances of his experience." 1I
The requisite special experience may be of a practical nature, acquired
through the pursuit of an occupation; or it may be the product of
systematic study.'37
General Scope: Expert testimony to economic or technological facts
is most likely to be challenged on the ground that (1) the evidence is
too speculative; (2) the opinion or interpretation is projected too far,
133. In an article, On the Use of Experts in Patent Cases, Judge Yankwich relates the
following incident: "The dissatisfaction of district judges with interminable analyses of
prior art is not new. I am told of an instance where a district judge from another state,
who afterwards became one of the judges of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and who,
knowing the habit of a certain patent attorney in introducing a large amount of prior art,
asked him how many prior patents he was going to analyze. When informed that he would
analyze some three hundred patents, he stated that he had other more important things to
do and would rather read them in the transcript. He instructed the Clerk to identify
them as exhibits, had a transcript of the testimony made, absented himself from court for
three days and thereafter read the analysis in the record. This is an extreme case, of
course, although it is an actual occurrence in the Southern District of California, and is
attested to by my present Clerk." 22 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 639, 648-9 (1940).
134. ROGERs, THE LAw OF ExPERT TESTIoNY v (3d ed., Werne, 1941).
135. 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 563 (3d ed. 1940) at p. 651.
136. 2 id. § 560 at p. 640.
137. 2 id. § 556 at pp. 635-6:
"This special and peculiar experience may have been attained, so far as legal rules
go, in any way whatever; all the law requires is that it should have been attained, .
In some instances the witness will need both; in some instances he may have
both, though he does not need both. Neither is generally favored above the other by the
Courts. The question in each instance is whether the particular witness is fitted as to the
matter in hand."
[Vol. 58: 12421260
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as, for example, where it embraces an ultimate issue in the case; or
(3) the opinion rests on unidentified or inadmissible hearsay.
Discussing testimony of a more or less speculative character, courts
have often stated as a rule of general application that an inference
could not be based upon an inference.1  However, this seems an
overly sweeping statement.3 0
\Vhere expert testimony is rejected as too speculative, with or with-
out reference to the supposed inference on inference rule, the failure is
usually attributable to doubt on the court's part with respect to (1)
the possibility of a valid expert contribution to the solution of the
question presented, (2) the general qualifications of the expert proffered
for the purpose, or (3) the sufficiency of the data on which the expert
professes to base his opinion. 
140
In the American Tobacco Co. case an expert statistician testifying for
the government was asked to state his conclusion '%ith respect to the
kinds of tobacco in terms of government grades bought by one of these
companies, American, Liggett and Reymolds, and those grades bought
by'more than one of these three companies" during the 1939 market-
ing season, taking into account certain data introduced in evidence
and assuming "that tobacco within a given government grade, in the
same belt, selling or reported as selling in this data at a price differ-
ential of one and one-half cents (1. "c.) or more was recognizably dif-
ferent tobacco to a tobacco expert buyer." There was some evidence in
the record, in the form of testimony by buyers, auctioneers, and ware-
housemen, to support the above assumption. The court sustained an
138. Many of these decisions are collected in 95 A. L. P_ 162 (1935).
139. "[I]t seems clear, after examination of all of the cases which have discussed
the question, that there is no such general rule in.the sense in which the language itself
implies.... The courts have apparently often used this phraseology merely as a con-
venient way of disposing of evidence which it regarded as too remote of uncertain to prove
the ultimate facts at issue.... What is meant primarily is that an inference cannot Le
based upon evidence which is uncertain or speculative, or which raises merely a conjecture
or possibility." Id. at 182.
Wigmore also denies any such rule concerning circumstantial evidence, 1 WxiGxnon,
EvmExca § 41 (3d ed. 1940) at pp. 434-41, and approves a statement in Xew York Life
Ins. Co. v. McNely, 52 Aiaz. 181, 195-6, 79 P.2d 948, 954-5 (193S), that: "[W]hen
an inference of the probability of the ultimate fact must be draw,.n from facts whose ex-
istence is itself based only on an inference or a chain of inferences, it vill be found that
the Courts have, with very few exceptions, held in substance, although usually not in
terms, that all prior links in the chain of inferences must be show.-n with the same cer-
tainty as is required in criminal cases, in order to support a final inference of the probabil-
ity of the ultimate fact in issue. We think that this is the true meaning of the 'inference
upon inference' rule in civil cases.. .."
140. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 39 F.Supp. 957 (E.D.Ky. 1941) (on ob-
jection to evidence), and United States v. Boston, Cape Cod & New York Canal Co., 271
Fed. 877 (1st Cir. 1921), are good examples.
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objection that the question called for pure speculation and a piling of
inferences on inferences.''
In the Boston, Cape Cod and New York Canal Co. case, 142 the issue was
as to the probable future growth and earnings of traffic through the
canal, as bearing on the value of the canal property in a condemnation
proceeding. A professor qualified as an expert on the history, theory
and practice of canal transportation proposed to base his estimate on the
record of the traffic and earnings of theSuez, Manchester, and Kiel canals,
The trial court excluded the facts and figures with respect to these three
canals, there being no showing of a similarity of conditions, but per-
mitted the expert to testify to his estimate for the Boston, Cape Cod
and New York Canal on the basis of his general background of knowl-
edge. This led to a reversal on appeal, on the theory that the jurors
needed no expert assistance to draw such inferences as could be drawn
from the data in the record concerning the Boston, Cape Cod and New
York Canal, and that the expert's opinion-since it Appeared to be
based on the experience of other canals, and since the tolls to be charged
for interstate traffic would depend on government regulation-wjs a
mere guess.
There are cases excluding expert opinion on the broad ground that
an expert should not be permitted to give an opinion on an ultimate
141. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 39 F.Supp. 957, 958 (E.D.Ky. 1941)
(on objection to evidence) :
"The assumption of fact set forth in the question propounded to the witness obviously
represents only a part of his basic hypothesis. As to other underlying facts lie is shown
to have taken into account and considered voluminous data, all of which was prepared
and introduced in evidence by other witnesses. There is no adequate disclosure of the
particular facts found in this copious data which tend to support his conclusions or to
which he attributed significance in forming his opinion as to the kinds of tobacco bought by
the respective companies 'in terms of Government grades'. The mere showing that the
witness 'considered' or 'took into accoint' documentary evidence brought into the case by
other witnesses without definitely showing the particular points or features of the evidence
upon which his opinion is predicated leaves the nature of his hypothesis so obscure it is
impossible to determine whether the opinion is based upon facts or mere inferences. An
expert opinion is not admissible in evidence when its factual foundation is nebulous....
"Moreover, since it appears from the evidence that throughout the marketing season
in each tobacco belt, tobacco is sold and graded at different times, at different places and
under varying conditions, to render the opinion admissible insofar as it rests upon the
stated assumption 'that tobacco within a given Government grade, in the same belt, selling
or reported as selling in this data at a price differential of one and one-half (1312) or
more, was recognizably different tobacco to a tobacco expert buyer', it would seem indis-
pensable that the Government produce proof showing that at the times and under the con-
ditions prevailing when the price differentials appeared they were reasonably attributable
to a difference in the tobacco itself rather than to market price fluctuations, varying con-
ditions under which sales were held at different times and places, variations in the judg-
ment of different buyers or other factors having no relation to the quality or grade of the
tobacco. Substantial evidence in this respect is lacking."
142. 271 Fed. 877 (1st Cir. 1921).
1262 [Vol. 58: 1242
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issue. 143 General support for so broad a proposition is, however,
lacking.1
44
Where an opinion is not to be confined to the interpretation of spec-
ified data already in evidence, the question of how far an expert may go
again depends on the multiple factors of (a) the scope of his expertness,
(b) the apparent validity of such hearsay information as he may profess
to take into account, and (c) the extent to which the premises for his
inferences are based on his own study, experience, and observation,
rather than on specific information supplied by other witnesses or
eNidence in the case. An expert representing a recognized and trusted
discipline or science may base conclusions on his general background
of study and observation, including the reported data of fellow sci-
entists and technologists, despite its hearsay character.1 ' But if the
scope of the expert's qualification-or the status of the special dis-
cipline which he represents-falls short, then he is likely to be con-
fined to the interpretation of specified data already in evidence. And
in any event, where the proffered opinion appears to be based on
factual premises supplied by other witnesses in the case rather than
by the expert from his own observation and experience, his testimony
will be accepted only in the hypothetical form. I
Economic Facts: Expert testimony to economic facts is normally
elicited from two types of witnesses-the "practical" expert whose
special knowledge is derived from personal experience in working in the
industry or trade in question, and the trained economist or business
analyst who, while perhaps never connected with the industry or
trade in question, has had occasion to make a special study of it. The
143. United States v. Spaulding, 293 U.S. 498 (1935) (issue of "total permanent dis-
ability"--war risk insurance case) ; Continental Casualty Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Tem-
ple, 116 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1941) cert. dcnicd, 313 U.S. 575 (1941) (issue whether assets
of bank were reduced-action on surety bond) ; Farris Y. Interstate Circuit, Inc., 116 Fd
409 (5th Cir. 1941) (issue of safety of construction and lighting of a theatrc-but v:me
question as to qualifications of expert in any event) ; Prentiss v. Chandler, 85 Fad 733
(9th Cir. 1936) cert. denied, 300 U.S. 654 (1937) (issue of solvency of bank at time of
payment of certain deposits-action by receiver).
144. In Ne-w York Life Insurance Co. s. lVolf, the foregoing broad proposition is in-
terpreted and limited: "Experts are not allowed to state their conclusions on the -hole
case as where under a hypothetical question an expert witness is asked to sum up the Cn-
tire issue and determine the ultimate question for decision by the jury. Uvitcd States T.
Spailding, 293 U.S. 498.... But the opinion here asked was not an opinion on the merits
of the entire case, and it has been repeatedly held by this and other courts that where evi-
dence will aid a jury in reaching a correct solution of the issues and is therefore pr,4erly
a subject of expert evidence, it is no objection that the opinion elicited from the expert is
on an issue or point to be decided by the jury." 85 F2d 162, 165 (8th Cir. 1936), cert.
denied, 229 U.S. 614 (1937).
145. 2 IVIGMORE, EVlDExCE § 665b (3d ed. 1940) at p. 784; Grayson v. Lynch, 163 U.S.
468 (1896).
146. See United States v. American Tobacco Co., 39 F.Supp. 957 (E.D.Ky. 1941), and
2 WIGMooE, EVmIENCE § 672 (3d ed. 1940) at pp. 792-5.
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scope permitted either type of expert will depend on the apparent
extent of his sources and knowledge. Problems in connection with
this type of testimony may be grouped under the following heads:
(1) industry history; (2) trade usages and customs; (3) volume of
production and sales; (4) distribution practices; (5) prices; and (6)
probability, cause and effect.
In the recent American Tobacco Co. case a witness for the govern-
ment who had supervised an NRA study of the tobacco industry was
permitted to narrate the development of the industry in the United
States. Following aft objection to such testimony insofar as it might
include "any facts within his lifetime unless he had a personal con-
nection with them" the following colloquy occurred:
"The Court: ...Are you merely calling upon him as an intro-
ductory matter for a historical sketch of a historic nature of the to-
bacco industry and that is as far as you are going?
"Q.: Precisely, Your Honor.
"The Court: Limit your answer to that, Mr. Vincent, and not to
any detailed facts in regard to the present operation." 147
When the witness began to describe brands which had appeared
between 1911 and 1920 there was an objection on the ground that
whatever had occurred after 1911 was "not a question of history, but
a matter in the memory of many of the living men in the tobacco in-
dustry and who actually know the facts," and that it was "perfectly
apparent that the witness doesn't know anything about it except from
investigation." This objection was overruled."' A practical expert
could, of course, testify to any developments in the industry to the
extent of his own personal knowledge and recollection; and standard
works and treatises are admissible to prove general facts of history.
Expert testimony to trade usages is commonly accepted.' With
respect to volume of production and sales, as on any other topic, a
147. Mimeographed Transcript, p. 5314, United States v. American Tobacco Co., 39
F.Supp. 957 (E.D.Ky. 1941).
148. Id. at 5326.
149. See, for example, Fidelity Investment Ass'n v. United States, 5 F.Supp. 19 (Ct.
Cl. 1933), cert. denied, 291 U.S. 685 (1933) (experts in the business of corporate securities
permitted to testify whether securities in question-which were of an unusual type-were
"known generally as corporate securities" within the meaning of the revenue act) ; Man-
hattan Oil Co. v. Mosby, 72 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 623 (1934)
(rancher and commission man of many years' experience permitted to interpret market
cattle quotations and apply them to cattle comparable to plaintiff's) ; and Victor v. Nat'l
City Bank of New York, 200 App.Div. 557, 193 N.Y.Supp. 868 (lst Dep't 1922), affld,
199 N.Y.Supp. 955 (1st Dep't 1923), aff'd, 237 N.Y. 538, 143 N.E. 733 (1923) (holding
that an assistant cashier of another bank, whose duties included issuing letters of credit
and passing on documents and drafts presented under such letters, might testify to the
meaning attributed in the trade to the word "shipment" when employed in a letter of
credit).
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witness with personal knowledge-as, for example, an officer of a
company testifying to the production of his company-may speak to
the extent of that knowledge. But an economist or statistician, whose
knowledge of production or sales volume is based purely on investiga-
tion and research, may be confined to summarizing and interpreting
appropriate data already in evidence, or otherwise identified and
available. In United States v. American Tobacco Co. an economic expert
not connected with the industry was confined in this fashion pursuant
to an objection that he should not be permitted to speak generally of
the volume of business done by each cigarette manufacturer since
1912.150
A practical expert may testify generally to practices and courses of
dealing in a trade or industry, to the extent of his knowledge and ob-
servation. In United States v. American Tobacco Co. numerous dealers,
auctioneers, and warehousemen were permitted to describe generally
the auction markets, their modes of functioning, and practices relating
thereto, in the areas and for the years in which they had been personally
active in such markets. And they were permitted to generalize con-
cerning the types of tobacco bid on by the buyers for each major com-
pany, and the maximum price each would bid, on the basis of mere
observation in the markets.
51
In the same case jobbers and retailers were similarly permitted to
testify generally to continuing distributive practices concerning manu-
facturers' price announcements, drop shipments, free goods, trade
discounts, and the like, to the extent of their professed personal ob-
servation, for the areas and during the period of time in which they had
been actively engaged.
The chief problem as to price phenomena concerns the mode of
proving actual (as distinguished from list) prices. An expert may, of
course, summarize any records or data already in evidence which re-
flect actual prices. Beyond this, however, whether his expertness is
based on practical experience in the industr, or on study and investiga-
tion, his testimony to actual price is likely to be confined to transactions
of which he purports to have personal knowledge and recollection. A
witness connected with a given company could testify to actual prices
charged or paid by that company, to the extent of his professed personal
knowledge. In United States v. American Tobacco Co. the government's
150. Mimeographed Transcript, p. 5332, United States v. American Tobacco Co, 39
F.Supp. 957 (E.D.Ky. 1941) (on objection to evidence): "The Court: If he has analyzed
some figures at some other time and some other place and some other figures, his analysis
would not be competent. In order to bring his testimony within the familiar rule, he must
show that the computation that he has made is a computation of a series of reports or fig-
ures that are in evidence in this case or else produce what computation he has made from
other sources. I don't know that it would be competent for him to testify as to his analysis
or computation of something that is not in the record."
151. Id. at 2639-71, 5776-580S, 5814-44, 2694-2714.
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economic expert was not permitted to testify whether, from his study
of the industry and experience in supervising the NRA industry study,
purchasers of cigarettes customarily took the listed discounts.1"' But
the same expert, over objection and after a voir dire, was permitted
to testify generally to the actual retail prices charged on a nation-wide
basis, his testimony being based on the NRA investigation made under
his supervision, which had included a field sampling of retail prices."'
Expert opinion may be projected to embrace the statement of con-
clusions as to probabilities, relationships, causes and effects, to be in-
ferred from data in evidence. The common objection is that such
evidence is speculative, and that the witness is being asked for a mere
estimate. But the only pertinent questions in any given case are
whether the witness appears to be sufficiently qualified for the pur-
pose, and whether expert assistance in drawing the particular inference
may be helpful.1
4
152. Id. at 5473-4:
"Mr. McLendon: We object to that, if your Honor please, unless he can furnish
the information on which he bases that. How could he possibly know such a fact as that
without the basic data from which to draw such a conclusion?
"Q.: If your Honor please, if the basic data on that subject were in the record it
would comprise all of the invoices, I suppose, for the period in question. It seems to me
Mr. Vincent is sufficiently familiar with this industry to make a statement of that kind
based on his study of the industry.
"The Court: He may be; I don't know. But without the data in the record, his mere
opinion of it, his interpretation of it would be incompetent."
153. Id. at 5476-80.
154. See 7 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 1976 (3d ed. 1940) ("There is no sufficient reason
for excluding such statements from qualified witnesses. . . ." (p. 121), and his comment
on the United States v. Boston, Cape Cod & N. Y. Canal Co. case, 271 Fed. 877 (lst Cir.
1921), discussed supra, p. 1262, that "[T]his ruling touches the top-notch as an exhibit of
the practical nonsense of the Opinion rule" (note, at p. 122) ) ; and State v. St. Paul City
Ry., 196 Minn. 456, 265 N.W. 434 (1936), wherein on an appeal from an order of the
State Railroad and Warehouse Commission requiring a street railway company to sell
two tokens for 15 cents during a temporary trial period, it was held over objection that
expert testimony was properly received as to what percentage of the patrons, given the
proposed change, would use tokens rather than pay cash fares. The Court said, "There is
no question of testimonial qualifications here. . . . In the instant case the trial court was
not in as good a position as were the experts to draw conclusions and inferences from the
evidence adduced at the hearing." Id. at 436-7.
Other cases supporting the same general proposition are Sheldon v. Moredale Realty
Corp., 29 F.Supp. 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) ; Consolidated Coal Co. of St. Louis v. The Polar
Wave Ice Co., 106 Fed. 798 (8th Cir. 1901) (coal dealer permitted to testify as to tile
amount of coal which a party could have sold in St. Louis between certain dates) ; and
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 39 F.Supp. 957 (E.D.Ky. 1941) (economic ex-
pert for the government permitted to testify that on the basis of data in evidence there was
no apparent relationship between leaf tobacco prices and the volume of production and
stocks on hand-but not permitted to testify to the status of commodity prices generally
in the United States at the time of a cigarette price rise in 1931, there being "no factual
basis in the record to sustain an expression of opinion upon that matter"; and University
of Kentucky field agent in agronomy permitted to testify that the proved average speed of
[Vol. 58: 12421266
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Technology and Patents: Expert testimony is frequently accepted by
the courts to prove the history and current state of a given technology
-or, in patent litigation, the prior art-and to interpret the spec-
ifications and claims of a given patent. Such testimony may be given
by a practising scientist in the field, or by a patent attorney qualified
as an expert for the purpose. Such testimony may relate to (1) the
history of the technology; (2) the construction of claims and spec-
ifications; or (3) the estimation of damages and profits from infringe-
ment.
The use of both types of experts to prove the development of the
technology and the state of prior art has been discussed by Judge
Yanlnvich. 155 The trained scientist may testify fully, on the basis of
his research and experience, to the general historical development, as
well as to particular phases of the science or technology bearing on an
issue of novelty of invention, infringement, etc. The legal "patent
expert" may analyze prior patents on the issue of prior art, and simi-
larly assist in the interpretation of the claims and specifications of a
patent in issue. , Decisions sustaining the admissibility of expert
testimony to aid in the interpretation of patent claims and specifica-
tions, like decisions on the admissibility of expert testimony of other
types, appear to turn on the apparent helpfulness of the proffered
testimony, taking into account the relative complexity of the questions
presented as well as the apparent qualifications of the expert.lcr
sales in tobacco auction warehouses was too fast to give buyers an opportunity fur fair
appraisal of the tobacco on which they were bidding) (mimeographed Transcript, pp.
5532, 5344, 2694-2714).
155. On the Use of Experts in Patent Cases, 22 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 639 (1940).
156. The considerations which determine the admissibility or inadmissibility of such
expert assistance have been discussed by Judge L. Hand as follows, in Kohn v.
Eimer, 265 Fed. 900, 902 (2d Cir. 1920) (patent infringement-affirming decree dismissing
the complaint and commenting on appellant's contention that prior art patents should not
be considered since appellee had called no expert at the trial to explain them) :
"We have not the slightest wish to minimize the vital importance of exrert testimony
in patent suits, or to suggest that we are not absolutely dependent upon it within its proper
scope; but that scope is often altogether misapprehended, as the appellant has misap-
prehended it here. Specifications are written to those skilled in the art, among whom judges
are not. It therefore becomes necessary, when the terminology of the art is not compre-
hensible to a lay person, that so much of it as is used in the specifications should be trans-
lated into colloquial language; in short, that the judge should understand what the
specifications say. This is the only permissible use of expert testimony which we recog-
nize. When the judge has understood the specifications, he cannot avoid the responsibility
of deciding himself all questions of infringement and anticipation and the testimony of ex-
perts upon these issues is inevitably a burdensome impertinence.
"Now the question whether the judge needs the assistance of experts to understand
the specifications is for him to decide...
"In the case at bar we see no reason whatever to differ from the learned District Judge
in his conclusion that the specifications of all these patents speak a language comprehensive
enough, without experts, for the disposal of the case."
157. Cases in which expert assistance was considered unnecessary and hence inappro-
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The estimation of damages and profits from infringement is governed
by Section 70 of Title 35 of the United States Code, as follows:
"[U]pon a judgment being rendered in any case for an infringe-
ment the complainant shall be entitled to recover general damages
which shall be due compensation for making, using, or selling the in-
vention, not less than a reasonable royalty therefor ...
"The court is hereby authorized to receive expert or opinion evi-
dence upon which to determine in conjunction with any other evi-
dence in the record, due compensation for making, using, or selling
the invention, and such expert or opinion evidence is hereby de-
clared to be competent and admissible subject to the general rules
of evidence applicable thereto." s
B. Conclusions
Technological Facts: Proof of this nature may be presented in the
form of an expert summary, and may include expert interpretation
of infringement hazards and of the necessity for and reasonableness of
what has been done with reference to technological developments and
patents.
The sources to be summarized will usually include, in addition to
the technological or patent expert's own special knowledge, patents,
patent office and judicial records, company records made in the regu-
lar course of business, special studies based on the foregoing types of
material made by persons working under the supervision of the expert,
and, to show the state of the art at various times, relevant foreign and
domestic technical publications and treatises, books copyrighted in the
United States and printed catalogues circulated in the trade.
So far as is practically feasible all of the foregoing source material
to be summarized or otherwise relied upon by the expert should be
put in evidence or at least made available to the adverse party. Some
of it, however, will be judicially noticeable; and as to the remainder,
given genuine practical difficulty in the way of production, and as
long as it appears to the court that the source materials are satisfactory
and would be admissible if available, there is substantial authority for
dispensing with their production.
One or more experts may summarize technological developments in
the industry as a whole, and there is no requirement that such an ex-
pert be associated with a particular company in order to speak of
developments within that company. To the extent that he has personal
priate are Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation v. George A. Breon & Co., Inc., 85
F.2d 166 (8th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 598 (1936) ; Young v. Ralston-Purina Co.,
88 F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1937) ; Ceasar v. Joseph Pernick Co., Inc., 1 F.Supp. 290 (E.D.N.Y.
1932) ; National Machine Corp., Inc. v. Benthall Machine Co. Inc., 241 Fed. 72 (4th Cir,
1916).
158. 60 STAT. 778, 35 U.S.C. § 70 (1946).
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knowledge, however acquired, he may speak from it; beyond that, he
may summarize acceptable source materials of the kinds indicated
above.
Notices of infringement, threats of litigation, settlements, purchases
of patents and the granting of licenses may be proved by the doc-
uments or correspondence involved, where these are available and
identifiable. Documents over thirty years old are, of course, self-
proving as "ancient". Lacking the documents, such transactions and
occurrences may be proved by company records made in the regular
course of business which happen to reflect them, or by a witness with
personal knowledge.
There is ample authority for the admission of opinion testimony by
a qualified technologist or patent expert to explain a technological
device or process, to interpret the specifications and claims of a patent,
to interpret other patents and literature reflecting the state of the art,
and to determine the existence of probability of infringement. Expert
testimony addressed to the ultimate necessity for and reasonableness
of what was done with reference to patents and patent conflicts should
so far as possible speak to the probabilities, causes and effects attend-
ing alternative courses of conduct rather than to the ultimate evaluation
of reasonableness.
Economic Facts: To prove industrial productive capacity, contem-
porary records of particular companies or the testimony of persons
connected with such companies and having the requisite personal
knowledge can, of course, be used. But there is no "best evidence"
requirement that the fact of productive capacity be proven in this
particular fashion.
Government reports, industry handbooks and other recognized
trade sources are admissible to prove capacity. A qualified expert may
summarize the results of a survey of productive capacity in the in-
dustry based on source data, whether compiled by himself or by others
working under his supervision. The testimonial summary should
clearly show the nature and identity of the sources upon which it is
based, and where practically feasible these should already be in evi-
dence or at least have been made available to the adverse party. Where
any of the sources cannot be produced, the testimony must at least
show their reliability and admissible character. With this foundation,
the precedents dispensing with the normal requirements of production
may be invoked.
The necessity for producing subordinates who participated in the
preparation of the summary is governed by similar considerations.
Where the expert's supervision has been so close as to amount to a
continuing check, production of the other participants is, of course,
unnecessary. Failing this, they would normally have to be produced,
since studies made for purposes of trial are not deemed to exhibit the
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same "guaranty of trustworthiness" as the records made in the regular
course of business. But here again the precedents for relaxing this
requirement on grounds of practical feasibility may be invoked.
List prices-whether of a company now in existence or of one no
longer in existence-may be proved in any one of several ways: quota-
tions in trade journals and lists or "price currents" circulated and
relied upon in the trade are admissible, as are government reports.
One whose business involves following the market and who has per-
sonal knowledge of the prices in question may testify. Records made
in the regular course of business in any given company showing prices
quoted by or to it are likewise admissible, the only problem in the case
of a company no longer in existence being to identify the records as
such where they are not sufficiently old to be self-proving. An expert
may compare the movement or other aspects of prices in the industry
with those of prices in other industries, as has been done in numerous
antitrust proceedings.
Differentials reflected in actual sales prices though not in published
discount sheets may be roughly approximated by a witness speaking
from personal knowledge, assuming that he can be shown to be suf-
ficiently acquainted with the courses of dealing in the areas whereof
he speaks. How far such a "practical expert" may go obviously depends
on the extent to which pricing practices lend themselves to patterning
and generalization. To measure the differential more exactly, sample
spot check tabulations from invoices, coupled with general "practical
expert" testimony as to the typical character of the areas and times
covered in relation to practices in other areas and at other times,
might be employed.
Volume of sales may be proved by the same types of evidence as list
prices. Government reports which measure up to the general require-
ments of an official record or report, to the extent that they happen to
be available and to cover the ground, would be the most conveniently
handled form of basic data.
There may be occasion to employ I.B.M. machine tabulations in
connection with proof of actual prices, volume of sales, and quantities
handled by particular distributors. In that event it should not be
necessary to put in evidence all of the invoices tabulated, or all of the
cards, worksheets, decoding sheets, etc. Samples should, however, be
offered; and the whole lot should be available to the adverse party for
purposes of cross-examination. The testimony of a witness who super-
vised and directed the study should suffice to support the offer in evi-
dence of the resulting tabulations, assuming that his supervision,
while falling short of an actual check of all the operations involved,
appears sufficiently close and informed to supply a practical "guaranty
of trustworthiness."
The financial statements of each company in the industry present
no serious problem of admissibility. Those of companies in exist-
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ence can readily be identified, whereas those of companies no longer
in existence will qualify as records made in the regular course of busi-
ness 159 and, where 30 years or more in age, will prove themselves as
ancient documents.
GENERAL IMaPLICATIONS
In this article and the preceding installment we have surveyed
some of the unique problems of proof and procedure which arise
when cases of such exceptional complexity as industry-wide pro-
ceedings under the Sherman Act are brought before ordinary judicial
tribunals shaped for vastly simpler situations. We have also sur-
veyed some of the working rules for court and counsel which have
been adopted in litigations of this sort. They involve some relaxation
of various rules of evidence and procedure which are considered feasible
and salutary in ordinary trials; and they pose some novel problems of
economic expertise. They indicate the ways in which the judicial in-
stitution has managed thus far to absorb these relatively indigestible
conflicts of interest.
How well the conflicts are being resolved is another question. The
public interest is to obtain as informed and adaptively value-oriented
findings of fact and prospectively operating decrees as possible. Here
we have reason to pause. Despite the procedural adaptations which
have been described, it is observable in these cases that the judicial
process is still over-loaded. The limitations of human thought fully to
comprehend any real social situation within a finite period with con-
ventionally finite investigative resources become painfully apparent.
Many realities of the situations in question tend to recede from the
focus of attention as litigation progresses, and the situations themselves
tend to be replaced by verbal patterns more manageable because
artificially simplified. The illusory character of the safeguards to de-
fendants supposed to inhere in the requirements that a "conspiracy"
or "intent to monopolize" be shown, for example, was discussed in the
previous installment.
There is no brief here, however, for any notion that a non-judicial
type of tribunal or agency would ipso facto do better. The use of in-
tellect and imagination, and the development of an inclination to due
process, probably become no easier if one is designated as an executive,
administrator or legislator, rather than a judge. The discussion has
pre-supposed an adversary procedure, be it judicial or administrative;
and it has pre-supposed that some if not all of the initiative to find and
present evidence rests on the parties rather than on the tribunal or
agency. Within this framework, any tribunal charged with decision
in a particular case is faced with the problem here discussed-that of
ways and means to ensure a more adequate flow of relevant informa-
tion in more assimilable form.
159. Within the meaning of the new 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1948).
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